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Abstract 
Law-based, civic-led advocacy has long been an important means for 
addressing rule of law deficits and problems of development and governance 
more generally. Authoritarian regimes, official and/or corporate foreign-based 
corruption and the structural limitations of formal rule of law mechanisms to 
deliver impartial justice have forced legal advocates to think creatively. This has 
resulted in some interesting examples of civic-led, law-based advocacy through 
both informal and formal structures, aimed at pursuing social justice. However, 
it is important to clearly distinguish legal mobilisation from illegitimate forms 
of legal instrumentalism, such as lawfare. 
In this Working Paper, I set out some of my current research ideas in this 
area and in particular explain my approach to researching legal mobilisation, 
which I regard as a practice as well as a socio-legal concept and approach, with 
a particular emphasis on the use of law as a form of political legitimacy. 
Keywords 
Legal mobilisation, lawfare. 
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Researching legal mobilisation and lawfare1 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Legal mobilisation is both a practice as well as an analytical concept. Those 
engaged in the practice of legal mobilisation must weigh a wide and potentially 
intimidating range of strategic variables in deciding whether or not to pursue a 
particular, law-based strategy. A wide spectrum of law-based strategies is 
available, ranging from a public campaign (such as a consumer boycott) or 
more formal, court-based public interest litigation. It is virtually impossible to 
analyse the potential impact of using any of these strategies, or a combination 
of them, with any kind of precision, particularly in circumstances where the 
conventional balance of powers is fundamentally skewed, in all corners of the 
globe. Furthermore, the dynamics of law-based, civic-lid advocacy are not only 
manifested in a politically-legitimate form of governance, but can also be 
studied as a form of legitimate counterpower, also against other, illegitimate 
forms of legal instrumentalism, such as lawfare (Handmaker and Taekema 
2019). 
In this Working Paper, I first justify legal mobilisation as a specific area of 
research. Second, I present an analytical lens of legal mobilisation to explain 
both the strategic potential and limitations of legal mobilisation (as a practice), 
including litigation, to secure progressive structural change by way of legal 
transformation. Further, I make a conceptual distinction between legal 
mobilisation and lawfare and situate both in a discussion on legitimacy. For the 
purposes of this working paper, I wanted to present a full picture of the 
analytical frames I am working with. However, I acknowledge that these are 
separate discussions, work-in-progress and are being elaborated in different 
publication outputs. 
My contention is that a multi-dimensional legal mobilisation lens can 
reveal the extent to which the courts and other means of civic-led, law-based 
advocacy are able to deliver social, economic, environmental and other forms 
of justice. This lens can also provide a nuanced explanation why inequalities 
are perpetuated and reinforced. Finally, I will highlight some of the empirical 
possibilities against which an analytical lens can be measured. 
 
                                               
1 An earlier version of this Working Paper was originally presented at a Colloquium on 
‘Legal mobilisation in a world marked by populism and crisis’, 12-13 June 2017 at 
Princeton University, USA, which was organised under the auspices of the EUR-
Research Excellence Initiative on Integrating Normative and Functional Approaches 
to the Rule of Law and Human Rights (INFAR). For more information, see: 
https://www.iss.nl/en/research/research-projects/integrating-normative-and-
functional-approaches-rule-law-and-human (Accessed 19.2.19). 
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2   Legal mobilisation as an area of  research 
Evaluating the potential of legal mobilisation has been under-studied as a 
research area, particularly in relation to its transformative character. The 
research in this area tends to be divided between two main strands. The first 
strand of legal mobilisation research draws largely on social movement theory 
to account for law-based advocacy, which focuses more on the aims, objectives 
and of a particular, law-based campaign, and also concerns mostly formal, 
court-based interventions. The second strand of legal mobilisation research 
focuses on how strategic or public interest litigation is justified and managed.  
2.1 Social movements and law-based advocacy 
In a session organised by Lisa Vanhala at the Law and Society Association’s 
annual conference in Toronto in 2018, various scholars addressed the current 
state of legal mobilisation research, with a particular emphasis on social 
movements (LSA 2018). This session revealed three main points of discord in 
conceptualising legal mobilisation as an area of research from this particular 
angle. The first point concerned which activities constituted legal mobilisation; 
i.e. exclusively litigation-centred or as a broader set of claim-making?  The 
second point was the object of legal mobilisation; i.e. who can be the target of a 
claim, and is it exclusively the state, or also private actors? The third point, 
somewhat related to the first, related more specifically to the type of claims that 
could be regarded as legal mobilisation; i.e. exclusively political claims, or also 
non-political claims? 
Lisa Vanhala, one of the leading scholars in this area, discussed how a co-
production of climate change mitigation and adaption strategies takes place, 
which mirrors a growth in climate change litigation across the globe. The 
growth of research in this area, she noted, can be regarded in three cumulative 
phases, the first being a recording of wins and losses in climate change cases 
being brought, the second being a more evaluative study of how these cases 
could potentially change policies or lead to more appropriate regulations and 
the third being a deeper study of how climate change litigation both more 
explicitly incorporated human rights and incorporated insights from 
technology studies. 
Vanhala’s (2014 and 2018) research on legal opportunity structures has 
been a major contribution to the second category of legal mobilisation 
research. She draws on social movement theory, which recognises shifts in the 
balance of political power, whereby the potential of legal mobilisation can 
transform marginalised or weak groups into political powers.   
McCann (2017) similarly regards litigation as a strategy. He has argued 
how it is important to study how litigation interacts with other strategies, and 
in particular how law frames the politics of social movements. Noting that one 
ought to be critical about their own research positionality, McCann observed at 
the LSA session that people should not be regarded as objects, rather they 
should be regarded as subjects, indeed reflexive agents. For example, this lack 
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of a critical-reflexive attitude on the part of lawyers can to some extent explain 
the crisis in international criminal justice (Handmaker 2018). Engaged 
practitioners also agree that a critically-reflexive positioning in relation to law is 
crucial. As noted by the Public Interest Litigation Project (PILP 2019) on their 
website: ‘(s)ometimes alternative routes to justice are blocked. Sometimes 
dialogue and lobbying are ineffective on their own. In these cases, legal action 
may be necessary’. 
PILP has a broader understanding of strategic litigation than that of most 
legal advocacy organisations, incorporating various forms of law-based, civic-
led advocacy, in addition to court-based litigation. However, while very 
conscious of the fact that strategic litigation relates to the aims, aspirations and 
strategies of broader social movements, PILP does not problematise this 
particular dimension. Similarly, critiques of organisations similar to PILP, such 
as a ground-breaking study by Sarat and Scheingold (1998) as well as Jason 
Brickhill’s (2018) more recent collection of public interest litigation narratives 
in South Africa, tend to focus on the issues to which legal mobilisation 
addresses itself as well as its perceived impact and value; in other words, how 
legal mobilisation is justified and managed. 
2.2 Justifying and managing legal mobilisation 
Strategic litigation, according to organisations like PILP relies on legal action as 
a means to bring about certain social, political or legal changes. PILP 
emphasises that the goal of strategic litigation is not necessarily to win a case 
for a particular client, but to ascertain the impact a legal procedure can have in 
the broader interests of a community. For this reason, strategic litigation is 
frequently referred to as impact litigation. 
Strategic litigation complements other ways of bringing about change; 
from lobbying and advocacy to community organising and protests. According 
to PILP, organisations like theirs should be an ally to activists, NGOs and 
grass roots organisations, which use a wider array of social mobilisation 
strategies. The start of a potential opportunity for strategic litigation – as for 
any form of activism – begins with a preliminary examination of what 
communities, activists, scientists, lawyers or NGOs perceive is posing a 
problem. In other words: what hurts and where? From this point, it needs to 
be considered whether litigation is indeed the best method to solve an issue, a 
question which requires understanding of the potential benefits and drawbacks 
of strategic litigation as a form of activism/intervention. If it is determined that 
strategic litigation should be pursued, what type of procedure is relevant and 
when is it regarded to be the best time? (Handmaker 2017: 4-5) 
I have not come across literature that regards legal mobilisation as a 
broader concept (beyond litigation) of legitimate, law-based, civic-led advocacy, 
and I could find no studies that regarded legal mobilisation as a form of 
counterpower. Most studies on civic-led advocacy have focused on a global, 
agency-focused perspective with civil society actors and movements as primary 
units of analysis (Welch 2001; Albrow et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2011 and 
Biekart 2013). Other studies of legal advocacy take a political ecology approach 
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that tend to – however understandably – negate law’s jurisprudential value, 
regarding the mobilisation of law and legal process as a means for regulating 
relationships between different stakeholders (Fay 2013) or as a subject of 
micro-study (Scheffer 2005). While valuable, such analyses have paid limited 
attention to the structural factors that confront human rights advocates and 
have generally failed to address the agency of government or indeed corporate 
officials.  
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3  A legal mobilisation lens 
Legal mobilisation as an analytical lens explains how interactions with the law 
can be productively combined with an approach based on legal pragmatism 
that, as Sanne Taekema notes, ‘does not reduce law to an instrument to 
advance social goals (but) sees law as both a means and an end in itself’, which 
is a ‘complex relationship’. Taekema goes on further to explain that, just like 
legal mobilisation, law is both a theory and ‘a practice which is characterised by 
a commitment to certain specifically legal ideals’ (Taekema 2006: 35). In other 
words, there is an intrinsic relationship, though often a large gap as well, 
between the aspirations of law and the empirical realities of legal practice. 
In this regard, the socio-legal concept of legal consciousness is key. As 
Mark Hertogh (2004: 461) has argued, it is more than merely an aptitude, 
competence or awareness of the law; legal consciousness also relates to 
perceptions and images associated with the law and legal enforcement. 
Building on what Ewick and Silbey (1998) had argued earlier, legal 
consciousness concerns how one either: reveres the legitimacy of law and legal 
process (before the law); is sceptical or cynical of the legitimacy of law and 
legal process and/or distrusting of the way in which it is implemented (against 
the law) or adopts an instrumentalist view of the law, regarding it as a ‘game’ 
(with the law). It is this latter characterisation that is most relevant to legal 
mobilisation. 
Furthermore, it is important to explore people’s imagination and 
expectations of the law as against the views of professional lawyers who tend 
to ‘ignore’ this (Hertogh 2004: 459). Accordingly, there are two principal 
approaches in legal consciousness literature. The first approach, drawing more 
on literature from American scholars, asks as its key question ‘how do people 
experience official law’ or what is referred to by various authors as ‘law in 
action’ (Ibid: 475; Merry 1990; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Nielson 2004) . Law is 
regarded by the researcher as an independent variable (i.e. official law as 
defined by the researcher). This approach often reveals a ‘persistent 
contradiction’ of the ideal (values) behind law and the actual (values) 
embedded in a particular action. The second approach, drawing on mainly 
European researchers, asks as its key question: what do people experience as 
law. This is what socio-legal scholars commonly refer to as the living law. Law is 
thus regarded by the researcher as a dependent variable (socially-defined), 
focussing more on the people and their own norms, studying the problem 
from below (Ehrlich 1936). This approach, reveals a ‘personalistic value 
orientation’ that places a ‘strong emphasis on the special circumstances of each 
individual citizen’, whereby legitimacy is based not on official, state-published 
legal definitions, but on the extent to which public officials feel a close affinity 
for their neighbourhood and for the citizens around them Hertogh 2004: 477-
478). 
In the remainder of this section, I distinguish between legal mobilisation 
and lawfare, the former being the legitimate use of law to underpin political 
claims, the latter being the illegitimate / hegemonic use of law by state and/or  
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corporate bodies to suppress these claims and to persecute individual 
advocates and NGOs. I then explain the core function of legal mobilisation as 
a legitimate political claim. Finally, I present the sub-components of legal 
mobilisation, as an analytical approach / lens to evaluate law-based advocacy, 
including but not limited to strategic or public interest litigation. 
3.1 Legal mobilisation vs. lawfare 
Law can be mobilised by civic actors (as well as states and other actors) as a 
legitimate political claim. As a form of legal mobilisation, law and especially 
human rights can serve as a positive legitimating force, reinforcing social 
justice claims as ‘an indispensable rhetorical tool against any form of 
dominance and attempted hegemony’ (Hoffman 2003: 121).  
However, in oppressive and imperialistic societies and political systems, or 
even in ostensibly liberal democratic regimes, law and even human rights can 
be a form of lawfare, taking negative, delegitimising and oppressive forms, 
justifying retrogressive policies and even reinforcing the hegemonic actions of 
states. 
Obvious examples of lawfare include treatment by the United States of so-
called enemy combatants or using law as ex post facto justification for torture or 
for foreign armed intervention (Akram 2010; Falk 2005). These forms of legal 
instrumentalism may even be expressed as well-intentioned, for example when 
the US government cynically invoked human rights terminology in order to 
construct a crisis and justify military intervention in countries abroad (Engle 
2007). Other examples of lawfare include measures designed to suppress 
activists’ free speech and expression, including by way of so-called Strategic 
Litigation Against Public Participation or ‘SLAPP’ suits (Murombo and 
Valentine 2011). 
The term lawfare, however, is contested. A first set of commentators who 
describe progressive, rights-based articulation of the strategic use of law – from 
climate change advocacy to pro-Palestinian advocacy – positively conceptualise 
these forms of law-based advocacy as ‘lawfare’ and conflate it with what I 
regard as legal mobilisation (Gloppen and St. Clair 2012; Kearney 2010; Myers 
2008; Fay 2013). However well-intended, I feel this conflation in terminology 
to be misplaced, not least because of how lawfare is instrumentalised by 
commentators and by Alt-right organisations as illegitimate forms of legal 
instrumentalism. 
This brings me to a second set of commentators, who are vehemently 
opposed to legal mobilisation by civic actors against states and corporations 
have referred to ‘lawfare’ in a disparaging way, in some cases describing the 
nature of civic-led legal claims as ‘legal jihad’ (Goldstein and Meyer 2009; 
Steinberg 2011). Bayefsky (1995: 425) has focused on international institutions 
through which legal mobilisation claims are often made, referring to what she 
regards as ‘the malignant nature of the United Nations human rights system’. 
This second set of commentators is often associated with organisations 
promoting an exceptionalist characterisation of international law, which reduce 
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international legal norms to narrow, nativist and otherwise parochial 
interpretations. These organisations include the Lawfare Project, Middle East 
Forum, Legal Insurrection, UN Watch, NGO Monitor and Eye on the UN.  Luban 
has observed, somewhat colourfully, that groups like these who condemn law-
based advocacy tend to suffer from ‘a paranoid overreaction to perfectly 
legitimate legal challenges’ (2008: 2021).  
In making a distinction between legal mobilisation and lawfare, I do of 
course recognise that states can potentially mobilise law in a progressive way 
and that civic and corporate actors can instrumentalise law in an oppressive 
manner. However, my primary emphasis in this paper is on the potential of 
civic-led legal mobilisation, which is both constrained by, and yet can also be a 
counter-hegemonic force against oppressive state power. Moreover, the 
strategic use of law by civic actors against powerful interests is regarded as a 
legitimate intervention to try and counter the illegitimate exercise of power by 
states, corporations or individuals who regard themselves as above the law.  
3.2 Legal mobilisation as a legitimate political claim 
Legal mobilisation involves the strategic use of law by civic actors to advance 
human rights, social justice and especially equality as a legitimate political claim. 
Legal mobilisation as a practice, including the pursuit of human rights and 
justice through the courts, is never a straightforward activity; it is regarded, 
more often by social scientists, and even by some lawyers, as a highly political 
act (Abel 1995; Gready 2004; De Feyter et al. 2011). As Abel’s (1995: 5) study 
of anti-apartheid legal struggles in South Africa vividly illustrated, law is a form 
of ‘politics by other means’. According to Abel, law can be effectively wielded 
as a shield (in order to protect individuals from abuse by the state) or as a sword 
(by oppressive regimes against perceived enemies of the state). For example, 
civic advocates have, accordingly, worked together with socially concerned 
lawyers, either in defence of individuals, or in lodging civic-led criminal 
complaints against alleged corporate or individual perpetrators, and also in 
challenging repressive government policies. 
Legal mobilisation involves direct or indirect challenges to a state or its 
agents who are alleged to be responsible for human rights violations, whereby 
the subjects (civic actors) become engaged in various interactions with the 
claimed perpetrators of these violations. Accordingly, those engaged in law-
based, civic-led advocacy have mobilised the law in different ways, which 
include: to end individual impunity for international crimes, to seek damages 
against companies and individuals and to challenge oppressive government 
polices by way of administrative review. 
Understanding the legal mobilisation concept as a legitimate means of 
claiming rights furthermore requires a critical appreciation of three additional 
elements, namely: the capacity of civic actors involved in legal mobilisation, the 
role of these civic actors as translators and the inherent structural bias of law 
and legal institutions. In the next section, I will discuss these three elements 
and develop a generalisable explanation of how civic-led, law-based advocacy, 
12 
 
or legal mobilisation, can hold states, corporations or individuals accountable 
for violations of human rights.  
3.3 Legal mobilisation as an analytical tool 
Accordingly, as a (legitimate) form of counterpower, to analyse the interplay 
between civic actors engaged in legal mobilisation, and the state institutions, or 
its agents, against whom the mobilisation is aimed, I develop three theory-
based propositions. The first proposition is that civic actors have a capacity to 
challenge the state, which enhances their legitimacy to mobilise (international) 
law, derived from various normative developments in human rights 
(Handmaker and Arts 2018). While the legal capacity of civic actors to bring 
claims is largely uncontested – although the space for bringing these claims is 
arguably shrinking – the political legitimacy that this legality confers is crucial to 
counter claims that advocates are abusing legal process. The second 
proposition is that civic actors engaged in legal mobilisation act as translators 
of global rules into a locally relevant context. The third proposition is that 
international law’s inherent structural bias truly matters in understanding the 
strategic potential for law-based advocacy, both in terms of the institutions 
against which legal mobilisation is directed as well as the substantive law that 
forms the basis of legal claims (Ibid: 13).  
Figure 1 
LM Analytical Framework  
 
Source: Handmaker 2019 
Legal Mobilisation 
as a Legitimate 
Political Claim
Capacity
Translation
Structural Bias
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3.3.1 Civic actors have the capacity to challenge the state 
The capacity of civic actors to promote and, in limited circumstances, impose 
state, individual and indeed corporate accountability towards national and 
international legal obligations through legal mobilisation has been shaped by 
structural changes in international normative frameworks and by associated 
political developments. 
While capacity is also about mobilising technical and other resources: 
people, money, and public support, as part of my analytical lens, capacity it 
about having legal standing to bring a formal claim, or asserting that capacity 
against a set of legal-normative expectations owed to individuals and groups, 
especially in relation to human rights law. 
According to the latter, the legal capacity of civic actors has emerged in 
what Ignatieff (1999) has termed a global human rights revolution, with 
juridical, advocacy and enforcement dimensions, though of a distinctly liberal 
nature (Ignatieff and Gutmann 2001). The liberal character of this revolution is 
problematic, as it has reflected a gradual reduction in the role of the state to 
police human rights violations, leaving the primary responsibility for enforcing 
rights claims to individuals. Mutua (2001, 2013) has referred to these 
developments as producing both a human rights movement and corpus that 
have in turn been accompanied by a range of attendant biases, most notably a 
Eurocentric orientation. 
These biases notwithstanding, developments in the human rights field 
have broken new ground for social-justice advocates, extending the normative 
scope of human rights law to address a wide range of social justice issues 
(Donnelly 2003; Higgins 1994). These normative developments have been 
matched by a corresponding increase in civic participation, and expanded use 
of accountability mechanisms in human rights advocacy (Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink 1999; Korey 1998). Civic actors are, consequently, active participants in 
international and national legal processes, who in some cases skilfully combine 
litigation with other forms of civic mobilisation, including interactions with the 
media, traditional sources of authority and global solidarity networks 
(Handmaker 2009: 28-41). 
Civic participation in legal process, and particularly the ability of civic 
actors to invoke national and international law and institutions, has indeed 
profoundly shifted the civic-state relationship, though by no means replaced it. 
The liberal democratic state and its institutions remain of primary significance, 
both as instruments for realising social justice and for repression. 
 
3.3.2 Civic actors are translators 
Drawing on their legal capacity to challenge the state, civic actors that are 
engaged in legal mobilisation fulfil a crucial mediating role in the translation of 
international legal norms into local contexts. It’s always a challenge to translate 
one set of norms and values to another. In relation to international law, 
translators must possess what Merry has described as a double consciousness 
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of the content of international law and the circumstances in which it is framed 
and enforced at the international level, as well as the relevant local / national 
context in which these international norms find expression (Merry 2006; 
Goodale and Merry 2007). This does not mean that those who are unfamiliar 
with international law and institutions are not in a position to bring a claim 
against the government, but it does mean that cases will less likely be reflected 
in international and comparative legal discourses. 
Measuring legal translation focuses on the social processes of human 
rights, which matter much more than whether rights are of a universal or 
culturally-relative character (Merry 2006: 39). One model of translation that 
Merry describes is replication, whereby the transnational norm sets the basis, 
while ‘distinctive content and structure’ provides local context; in other words, 
international norms are ‘thinly adapted’ to the local, contextual circumstances 
(Ibid: 44). A concrete example here would be a global campaign to end 
statelessness, whereby local language and customs are invoked to explain the 
purposes of the global campaign to a church congregation in Johannesburg 
(LHR 2016). Another model of translation is hybridity, in which case the global 
model interacts more deeply with the local context, producing what are 
referred to as ‘hybrid institutions’; in other words, the international model is 
‘thickly shaped by local institutions and structures’ (Merry 2006: 46). A 
concrete example here would be Court Users Committees in the Zomba 
Judicial District of Malawi, which makes strong reference to international law 
in terms of its values and norms, but enhances its legitimacy through the 
involvement of traditional leaders, community-based organisations and other 
non-state actors that guide the need for and implementation of procedural 
reforms in the local judicial system (DeGabriele and Handmaker 2005: 168). 
 
3.3.3 The relevance of structural bias 
Translating social justice concerns into legal rights through legal mobilisation 
requires a keen appreciation of institutional structures and substantive law, 
which heavily condition civic efforts to hold states accountable to international 
human rights norms and tends to favour powerful and elite interests 
(Handmaker and Arts 2018: 235). Accordingly, the third component of my 
legal mobilisation framework applies what Koskenniemi (2009: 9) has referred 
to as the concept of ‘structural bias’ of global governance institutions, which 
refers to ‘the way in which patterns of fixed preference are formed and operate 
inside international institutions’ and tend to favour elite interests. Koskenniemi 
(2011: 9-12) further argues that structural bias emerges as a consequence of 
international law’s fragmentation, meaning that international law is not the 
homogenous system it once was, but has evolved into ‘a wide variety of 
specialist vocabularies and institutions’; these include humanitarian law and 
human rights, which are some of the more recent, and highly-contested of 
these vocabularies. On the one hand, Koskenniemi observes, the rhetoric of 
rights is said to have lost its ‘transformative effect’ through over-legalistic 
explanations and is, correspondingly, ‘not as powerful as it claims to be’ (Ibid: 
133). 
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The structural bias of law is just as prevalent at the national level, which 
Galanter (1974) has observed tends to systematically favour elite sections of 
society, categorised as repeat players who make frequent use of the legal 
system (and particularly litigation) in order to shape the law and secure their 
interests.  
This three-dimensional prism forms an analytical basis for assessing the 
potential of legal instrumentalism, whether as a lens to assess socially-
progressive forms of legal mobilisation or as a contrasting lens to oppressive 
forms of lawfare. This lens forms an analytical basis for assessing the potential 
of legal mobilisation to lead to social transformation, in relation to a potentially 
very wide range of case studies. 
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4   Empirical possibilities for applying a legal mobilisation 
analytical lens 
The case studies against which a legal mobilisation lens, and the concept of 
lawfare can be applied is potentially limitless. Earlier research I conducted of 
law-based civic advocacy have been applied to very different contexts, 
including the protection of migrants and refugees in post-apartheid South 
Africa through litigation and other law-based tactics (Handmaker 2009; 
Dugard et al. 2011). Another study concerned the mobilisation of migrants’ 
rights in Chile (Mora and Handmaker 2014).  
Another potential topic I intend to study includes law-based and in some 
cases transnational advocacy strategies on behalf of refugees and migrants, 
where the global North and global South become blurred. This includes 
examples of legal mobilisation for refugees and migrants in transit countries, 
such as South Africa, as well as legal mobilisation for migrants in once 
hospitable countries, such as the United States and the Netherlands. There are 
also numerous examples of lawfare, by which governments seek to limit, deter 
or even criminalise migrants and the choices they are able to make to move to 
another country and settle there. The resulting narratives that emerge from 
these ostensibly different migration regimes create the possibilities for law-
based transnational migrant advocacy that transcends national boundaries and 
draws legitimacy from international law as well as the far-reaching mandates of 
intergovernmental agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees and International Organisation for Migration. 
A second potential topic against which I intend to apply this analytical 
lens, together with my colleague Margarethe Wewerinke (2014) include 
transnational, law-based advocacy – from broad-based popular movements to 
the courts – to mitigate and adapt to climate change, drawing on ground-
breaking judicial precedents in the Philippines, the Netherlands and Pakistan. 
These include legal mobilisation strategies of a range of transnational civic 
actions, including Greenpeace International, Earthrights, Friends of the Earth, 
Urgenda, Law of Nature Foundation and other organisations, where human 
rights have been successfully interwoven into global campaigns and litigation 
strategies. Further examples of lawfare abound in this area, where states and 
especially corporations seek to harass, restrain and in multiple other ways, for 
example through SLAPP suits designed to prevent environmental advocates 
from pursuing advocacy on environmental harm and climate change. 
A third topic against which I intend to apply the analytical lens of legal 
mobilisation are efforts to hold corporations accountable for violations of 
international law, and especially human rights violations abroad (for example in 
countries experiencing military conflicts and/or authoritarian regimes). Again, 
examples of lawfare are evident, whereby states have created an enabling 
environment for corporations to act with impunity. These include the ability of 
corporations to make compensation claims against other states and individuals 
who have hindered their business activities through, for example, regulatory 
measures or consumer boycotts. A further dimension of this is to relate legal 
mobilisation, as a concept, against a framework of business ethics. 
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In analysing such a diverse range of case studies, my contention is that the 
broader interplay between civic actors and the government in the context of 
legal mobilisation to hold states accountable to their international human rights 
obligations can to a large extent be understood in general terms, applying 
common conceptualisations of social justice across different themes and 
geographies. Making such a broad claim requires an engagement not just with 
the vertical orientation of law (rights-based obligations owed by states towards 
individuals), but also with the horizontal orientation of law that regulates 
relationships between private individuals and potentially also self-enforcement 
mechanisms such as national human rights institutions.   
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